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Siegel: The Continuing Duty Then and Now

THE CONTINUING DUTY THEN AND NOW
David M Siegel*

I. INTRODUCTION

The recognition in the American Bar Association ("ABA")
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases ("ABA Guidelines" or "Guidelines")' of a
continuing duty on the part of defense counsel to safeguard the interests
of former clients by facilitating the work of successor counsel was, and
is, essential to implementing post-conviction review of the effectiveness
of their representation.2 It is very difficult to meaningfully assess a
defense lawyer's representation if one cannot access her files (or if they
are incomplete) and her strategic thinking and research ideas, let alone
her testimony. The continuing duty's inclusion in 2003 was "new"
insofar as prior practice guidelines and public recognition were
concerned (with the exception of one state ethics opinion 3 and one
undistinguished scholarly article);4 but over a century before, there had
been isolated instances of lawyers discharging a continuing duty to
former clients by facilitating their post-conviction efforts. The
continuing duty's inclusion in the ABA Guidelines was remarkable, not
as a break from existing doctrine, but because it had almost never been
articulated as extending, in scope and duration, to affirmative practices
during the post-conviction phase.

* Professor of Law, New England Law IBoston.
1. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES], availableat http://www.ambar.org/2003Guidelines.

2. Id. Guideline 10.13, at 1074.
3. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1992127 (1992), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/linkclick.aspxfileticket=FxYHJ4sE3Ws%
3d&tabid=839.
4. David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical Obligations
of Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 107-08 &
nn.80-82 (1999).
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Part II of this Article reviews these historical antecedents (many of
which involved capital cases) in which lawyers acted upon a continuing
duty to enable their former clients to advance post-conviction claims,
sometimes before any existing jurisprudence supported these claims.5
Operationalizing the continuing duty, however, required more than
simply stating its existence. It required that practitioners take the four
steps set forth in Guideline 10.13,6 even when doing so could present an
apparent ethical dilemma for former counsel: facilitating post-conviction
claims alleging their own ineffective assistance.7 The Guideline offered
an unqualified assertion concerning actions former counsel should take
in detailing her strategic thinking to successor counsel, even when
detailing this thinking would be used for the purpose of the former
client's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC"): "To do
otherwise is professionally unethical.",8 At least one jurisdiction-specific
performance guideline promulgated since issuance of the ABA
Guidelines reflects this position as well. 9 This latent ethical conflict,
creating a fundamental practical hurdle for many post-conviction
claimants, became patent in 2010 with the Formal Opinion of the ABA's
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility ("ABA
5. See infra Part II.
6. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 10.13, at 1074 (setting forth that previous
counsel must maintain files that will adequately "inform successor counsel of all significant
developments," provide the files and all information about the representation to successor counsel,
"shar[e] potential ...areas of legal and factual research with successor counsel," and cooperate in
successor counsel's "professionally appropriate legal strategies").
7. Id.Guideline 10.13 cmt., at 1075 ("Specifically, [prior counsel] must cooperate with the
professionally appropriate strategies of successor counsel (Subsection D). And this is true even
when (as is commonly the case) successor counsel are investigating or asserting a claim that prior
counsel was ineffective.").
8. Id.
9. The Texas State Bar's Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel specifically
delineate how counsel should discharge the continuing duty-both as successor counsel and prior
counsel. See generally STATE BAR OF TEX., GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR TEXAS CAPITAL
COUNSEL, in 69 TEX. BAR J. 966, 966-982 (2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death PenaltyRepresentation/Standards/State/TXBar Associatio
n_adopted version of ABAGuidelines.authcheckdam.pdf. With respect to successor counsel,
Guideline 11.1(B) provides: "Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct a full
examination of the defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. This obligation
includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the defense team and examining
the files of prior counsel." Id.Guideline 11.1 (B), at 972. With respect to prior counsel, Guideline
12.1 (F) provides:
Trial counsel should cooperate with successor direct appeal, habeas and clemency
counsel in providing relevant information to successor counsel, including trial counsel's
prior representation files upon the client's consent, in order to maintain continuity of
representation, and to assist future counsel in presentation of issues relevant to
subsequent litigation efforts.
Id.Guideline 12. 1(F), at 975.
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Committee" or "Committee"),' ° addressing how counsel's continuing
duty to her former client should affect her interaction with the
prosecutor. The Formal Opinion's reinforcement of the continuing duty
should increase awareness of this duty beyond the more specialized
practice of capital post-conviction litigation." The relatively few
reported cases to date concerning implementation of this duty and the
carrying out of the steps recommended by the ABA Committee suggest
it is being formalized in the capital and non-capital contexts. Thus, it is
particularly odd that several state ethics bodies have disagreed with the
Committee's recommended steps. Part III of this Article reviews the
developing jurisprudence and the treatment of the Formal Opinion in the
four ethics bodies that have addressed the matter to date. 12 It is hoped
that greater familiarity with the process will lead to a different
conclusion concerning the viability of the Formal Opinion.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE CONTINUING DUTY OF COUNSEL
The continuing duty has three principal sources: the duty of loyalty,
the duty of competence, and the constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance. 3 The duty of loyalty, principally a duty to safeguard client
confidences and defend privileged communications against compelled
disclosure, is hundreds of years old. The duty of competence is much
newer, though perhaps not as new as is typically assumed. It is usually
understood as dating, for federal constitutional purposes, back to Powell
v.Alabama,'4 but court decisions had found representation inadequate
under state constitutions and state statutes for decades before Powell,
and had also occasionally cited the Federal Constitution. '"
That there is a conflict between a lawyer for one party in a criminal
case, having represented the other side, even if there is no obvious use of
the knowledge gained by the prior representation, was firmly established

10. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion].
11. Kim Alderman & Byron Lichstein, Protect Confidentiality in Ineffective Assistance
Claims, Wis. L.J. (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:19 AM), http://www.wislawjournal.com/2010/10/19/protectconfidentiality-in-ineffective-assistance-claims. There is no easy solution to correcting the
misconception that an IAC claim serves as an automatic waiver of confidentiality between
defendant and trial counsel. The recent ABA Formal Opinion 10-456, along with efforts on the part
of post-conviction litigators to make trial counsel and the state aware of defendants' right to
continued confidentiality, despite an IAC claim and until a court orders otherwise, should combat
unintentional violations of ethical obligations preceding IAC hearings.
12. See infra Part Il1.
13. See State v.Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1155 (Okl. 1990).
14. 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932).
15. See, e.g., Batchelor v. State, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (Ind. 1920).
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long before formal ethics rules existed. Similarly, decisions were
rendered invalidating convictions for incompetent representation before
the U.S. Supreme Court found a constitutional basis for the right to
effective assistance of counsel. A brief review of this history suggests
these instances were often capital cases.
A. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty, which generally forbids a lawyer who has
taken confidences from a client from subsequently representing one of
adverse interest in the same matter, is quite old. 16 Its earliest American
application in a criminal case appears to have been in an 1852 Georgia
decision in which a former solicitor general of the state, who had
"prefer[red] a bill of indictment," was thereafter barred from
representing the indicted defendant as a matter of public policy,
notwithstanding his departure from government service, because he
would be seen as having knowledge of the case that would thereby
unavoidably be used by the defense.' 7 An 1861 Indiana Supreme Court
decision overturning a rape conviction addressed the converse sideswitching situation of a lawyer who was briefly retained and paid by a
defendant and had some communication with him, who thereafter
returned his retainer and18 instead represented the complaining witness
and prosecuted the case.
Explicitly noting that it was not addressing any contract issues, the
Indiana Supreme Court cited some practice treatises and based its
decision on what might be termed fundamental fairness-although the
court cited no specific legal principle. 19 In a per curiam opinion, the
court explained the consequences of permitting such conduct:
With what confidence could one, arraigned upon a charge of crime,
confer with his attorney, or reveal to him his evidence, and thereby
prepare for his defense, if that officer is permitted, after thus acquiring
such knowledge, to change their relative positions, and instead of
standing up as his defender, to stand forth as his accuser. Would he not
consider it better to stand mute, dumb, as the sheep before the shearer,
rather than disclose the evidence which might thus be turned against
16.

Charles W. Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 677 n.4

(1997) (citing PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 123-24 (1992)).
Professor Charles Wolfram notes an apparent instance of lawyer loyalty at issue from counsel
switching sides in a 1282 English pleading. Id.; see also Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Ves. 261,
261-63, 266-68 (1815).
17. Gaulden v. State, 11 Ga. 47, 47, 49-51 (1851).
18. Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392, 394-96 (1861).
19. See id.
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him? He might perhaps, truthfully, believe it more to his interest to
return to the practice of a semi-barbarous age, when the prisoner was
not heard in his defense by counsel, or witnesses in his behalf, than
thus to have the weapons of his defense turned against him, by those
in whom, 20
by the acknowledged law and the statute, he had a right
to confide.
The court recognized, in language long predating modem concepts
of cognitive bias and behavioral economics, 21 that although the
defendant averred that his former lawyer had been told the "facts and
evidence in his defense," it was more than a little curious that the lawyer
had carefully sworn in response that there was no conflict because he
had not thereby learned the "grounds or means of defense." 2 This, the
court concluded, was not possible.23
Professor Charles Wolfram, in a seminal modem account of the
Former-Client conflicts problem, concludes that, with two important
exceptions, the duty of confidentiality essentially demarcates the duty of
loyalty to the former client.24 One of those exceptions, the "attack on
[one's] own work," is the specific instance of the obligation of the
continuing duty of counsel.25
B. Duty of Competent Representation
Before the ABA acknowledged that there might be a tension
between counsel's duty to provide competent representation and its
continuation after the representation-as an obligation to assist the
former client's successor counsel, even if it meant showing counsel's
own shortcomings-there had to be a duty to provide competent
representation in the first place. A 1912 Yale Law Journal comment
20. Id. at 395.
21. Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 489 & nn.127-28 (2009) (citing authorities for

the effect of psychological phenomena of confirmation and hindsight biases affecting prosecutors'
ability to re-examine convictions with claims of innocence).
22. Wilson, 16 Ind. at 395 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. The court noted:
We cannot see how he could know, in advance of the trial, that the facts and evidence in
favor of the defense, if disclosed to him, could not be made available by him, in some

one of the phases the defense might assume, either in shaping questions or producing
witnesses. If the defendant had not disclosed the facts and evidence in the case, why did
not Mr. Flagg so state? He was certainly attempting to place himself in a position that

should have called forth the utmost precision, in showing that he had not acquired from
the defendant any information which he might use to his detriment.
Id. at 395-96.
24.

Wolfram, supra note 16, at 680.

25. Id.
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succinctly summarized the state of the law, which will be familiar to
anyone who has read Strickland v. Washington,26 thusly: "The mere
incompetency of an attorney does not ordinarily constitute a ground for a
new trial nor justify a reversal. There must be a strong showing both of
incompetency and prejudice. 2 7 Although intoxication,28 insanity, and
general incompetency of counsel would not qualify, capital cases
appeared to call, at least in some instances, for relaxation of this rule. "In
criminal cases, and especially in cases involving the life of the
probably be justified in adhering to the rule
defendant, the court would
29
strictly.,
less
somewhat
The acknowledged law, from civil cases and generally applied
equally in criminal ones, was that a client was held responsible for an
attorney's negligence or incompetence. 30 These early (often capital)
cases recognized, as a basis for invalidating a conviction, the deprivation
of a fair trial or the protection of a defendant from "oppression.", 31 While
the reported cases are few, there were early instances of attorneys,
outmatched or outgunned by the government, who subsequently averred
their own shortcomings.
In an 1893 capital murder case from the New Mexico Territory, for
example, a defendant convicted in a highly charged atmosphere,
manacled and surrounded by armed men throughout his trial (less than a
week after the death), sought a new trial on the basis that he was denied
a change of venue and a continuance, even though his trial counsel had
sought neither. 32 Instead, on appeal, his (new) lawyer offered an affidavit
from trial counsel explaining that he had feared violence against his
client if he had made either motion.3 3 The court noted trial counsel's
intimidation was shown both by his affidavit and "even more clearly" by
the record, revealing he made no objections nor offered any argument.3 4
After the prosecution rested, the defendant "thr[ew] himself upon the
26. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
27. Comment, Technicalities in Criminal Procedure-Reversal for Inadequacy and
Inefficiency of Counsel, 21 YALE L.J. 505, 505 (1912).
28. O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W. 666, 669 (Ky. 1903) (ruling that the appellate court
is powerless to review a decision of the trial court rejecting a claim that counsel was too intoxicated
to perform adequately as defendant made no complaint at trial).
29. State v. Benge, 17 N.W. 100, 102 (Iowa 1883).
30. State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321, 324 (1880), afftd, 74 Mo. 222 (1881) ("As a general rule,
parties are held to a strict responsibility for the acts or omissions of their attorneys.").
31. Id. at 324-25.
32. Roper v. Territory, 33 P. 1014, 1015 (N.M. 1893). His lawyer had been warned at a
citizens' committee meeting prior to trial that his client would receive a "fair trial," but that there
would be no changes of venue or continuances. Id. at 1016 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 1016.
34. Id
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mercy of the court" and requested an additional lawyer, who was
promptly appointed to represent him.35 The New Mexico Supreme Court
found he had been denied a fair trial because, though he would
have been entitled to a change of venue as an absolute right under
the circumstances, he was deprived of it through intimidation of
his counsel.36
A similar South Carolina lynch mob trial of an African-American
defendant convicted and sentenced to death was challenged on the basis
of his trial lawyer's acknowledged mental instability during his case.37
The lawyer had been "mentally unbalanced" and hospitalized at some
point before the trial, and admitted that he had been "unbalanced" during
the trial and during the defendant's subsequent sanity hearing (to
determine if the defendant had become insane and so could thereby not
be executed).3 8 Nevertheless, the lawyer's admitted mental instability
did not appear to have affected the quality of his representation. It did
"not appear that he did or left undone anything which would probably
have affected the result., 39 Indeed, he appeared to have done better than
the average lawyer.
Long before the Federal Constitution was held to impose a right to
effective assistance of counsel, one state court decision, applying a state
constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel, had so held. The
earliest reported American decision invalidating a conviction for
ineffectiveness of counsel appears to be an 1882 opinion by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals 40 overturning a capital murder conviction and
death sentence. 41 The decision is strikingly modem: it examines the
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. State v. Bethune, 75 S.E. 281, 282 (S.C. 1912). This is the appellate court's description of
the trial:
Unusual interest on the part of the public was taken in the trial, and there was
considerable feeling of resentment and indignation against the defendant, which was
manifested by threats on the part of the friends and relatives of the deceased that, if he
were convicted of anything less than murder, he would be lynched. These threats were
brought to the attention of the presiding judge, who caused 10 or 12 extra deputies to be
sworn in to preserve order and protect the prisoner. During the trial, the courthouse was
crowded to standing room. The space within the bar was filled, and some of the audience
were allowed to sit on the steps leading to the judge's bench.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Edward Lewis and Robert Bakewell were two of the original justices of this court, which
was established in 1875. Joy I. Hannel, Celebrating125 Years of Justice: A History of the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District 1876-2001, YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/
file.jsp?id=3500 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
41. State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App. 93, 95-98 (1882). The opinion, by the three-judge panel, reads
that one justice concurred in the opinion and a third "concur[red] in the result, but has not seen this
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quality of counsel's representation despite the absence of any legal error
in the trial.42
The court acknowledged the "rigid rule" that in civil cases there is
no relief available from a judgment based upon attorney negligence,4 3
though it noted a New York civil case in which relief had been granted
upon a showing of "gross ignorance, incompetence, or misconduct" of
an attorney. 44 The absurdity of applying a rule that forces a defendant to
suffer his lawyer's shortcomings will sound familiar. The court stated:
But must there be absolutely no limit to the operation of this rule,
even where a human life is at stake? If an attorney should become
insane during the progress of a trial, and should thereupon take such
steps as should insure the conviction of an innocent client, would no
relief be possible? To say so, would be a libel on the law. In looking
over this record, we find, in the performance of the counsel for
the defendant, an exhibition of ignorance, stupidity, and silliness
that could45not be more absurd or fantastical, if it came from an idiot or
a lunatic.

Basing its decision on the Missouri Constitution's grant of a right to
counsel in criminal cases, the court held "that the prisoner here, in effect,
went to his trial and his doom without counsel, such as the law would
secure to every person accused of crime. 46 Not only did the court base
its decision on an understanding of the right to counsel as a right to
effective assistance of counsel, but it also acknowledged (at least in
dicta) a continuing ethical obligation of counsel to one's former clienteven in a post-conviction allegation of deficient performance-by
questioning the appropriateness of trial counsel's post-conviction
submissions. More than 120 years before the publication of the ABA
Guidelines, a court in a capital case questioned the propriety of a
lawyer voluntarily providing a contrary view of the facts from that of his
former client.4 7

completed opinion." Id. at 98.
42. Id. at 93-94. The court in State v. Jones held:
It is not satisfactorily shown to us that any error was committed by the court in the
conduct of the trial, but our attention is strongly called to its refusal to sustain a motion
for a new trial, based upon the alleged ignorance, imbecility, and incompetency of the
defendant's attorney, and his gross mismanagement of the cause.

Id.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 97; Bowman v. Field, 9 Mo. App. 576, 576 (1881).
Jones, 12 Mo. App. at 97 (citing Sharp v. Mayor, 31 Barb. 578 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860)).
Id. at 94-95. But see State v. Dreher, 38 S.W. 567, 570-71 (Mo. 1897).
Jones, 12 Mo. App. at 98.
Id. at 93-95.
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The defendant was alleged to have confronted the victim lying in a
hammock, without any witnesses, who jumped up and swore he would
kill the defendant. 48 The defendant claimed self-defense, and apparently
gave this account to the authorities. 49 Defendant did not testify at trial,
and later claimed that he told his lawyer he wanted to testify in his own
defense, but was advised that he was not competent to do so as he was
charged with murder. 50 Defendant averred this in an affidavit, and trial
counsel responded with his own affidavit to the effect that he had
advised the defendant that, while he had a right to testify in his own
defense, his statement to the authorities would be sufficient for the
purposes of the defense. 5'
So far, this would be a familiar dispute between former client and
counsel concerning what was said or not said. What is significant is the
court's description of the lawyer's affidavit in response. The court found
defendant's affidavit persuasive, and specifically questioned the ethical
position of counsel in offering an affidavit:
Considering the existing exigencies, it may be doubted whether the
reason given by the attorney for keeping his client off the stand was
any more creditable to his professional discrimination than the one
stated by the prisoner. But waiving that, and also the seeming
impropriety of an attorney's volunteering an affidavit to prevent his
convicted client from getting a new trial, we think that the general

aspect of the record so far corroborates 5the
affidavit of the prisoner as
2
to entitle him to the benefit of the doubt.
This was apparently an astonishing result. Seven years later, considering
another death-sentenced defendant's claim that his attorney too had
been so incompetent as to deny him a fair trial, the Missouri Supreme
Court declared:
After a most laborious search we have found but one case in which an
appellate court has reversed a sentence or judgment on the ground of
the negligence or incompetency of an attorney. That case is State v.
Jones. In that case no authority was found upon which to base the
ruling, and we cannot find that it has ever been followed in this or any
other state. We readily agree with the learned court that decided that
case that the record presented a most lamentable example of ignorance
and incompetency, and that the trial court should have afforded the
remedy by setting aside the verdict and appointing a competent
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 95-96.
Id.at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). But see State v. Dreher, 38 S.W. 567, 570 (Mo. 1897).
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attorney for the prisoner; but we think that the court of appeals in that
case suffered a hard case to make bad law, and ignored the fact that it
was a court for the review of errors only, and that it was confined to
such errors as appeared on the record proper, and to such exceptions as
had been ruled on by the trial court. For the distinguished jurist who
wrote that opinion and his associates we have the profoundest respect.
We doubt not that, in that individual instance, their judgment wrought
justice; but we cannot give it our sanction 53as a rule of practice or
procedure, and it is accordingly disapproved.
Not only did the Missouri Supreme Court reject the concept that
ineffectiveness of counsel that was not due to some conduct of the state
could be a basis for relief, 54 but it explicitly acknowledged the

reputational interests of counsel in a post-conviction attack:
We are bound to presume that the court which appointed the counsel to
defend the prisoner in this case knew him to be a reputable member of
the bar, and that it discovered nothing in this conduct calling for his
displacement and the appointment of another in his stead. To sustain
this contention would be to condemn the counsel, who gave defendant
his services without reward, without according him a hearing in a
matter vitally affecting his professional standing, and would be an
indirect censure of the court, who was55a witness to his conduct
throughout the trial. We will not do either.
Despite the absence of constitutional recognition that representation
could be so deficient as to invalidate a conviction, a handful of earlyoften death penalty-cases held just that. The Illinois Supreme Court
held in 1911 that an unemployed coal miner convicted of murdering a
railroad construction worker outside Marion, Illinois had received
representation so deficient from his two appointed lawyers that he faced
"oppression," in that one lawyer had fewer than two years of experience
56
and the other had practiced only civil law.
Similarly, in People v. Nitti,57 death sentences for an Italian
immigrant convicted of murdering the farmer for whom he worked in
(then) rural Cook County and for the farmer's wife (who allegedly had
53. Dreher,38 S.W. at 570-71 (citation omitted).
54. The court explained:
The neglect of an attorney is the neglect of his client, in respect to the court and his
adversary. The decisions are too numerous to cite, but their uniform tenor is to the effect
that neither ignorance, blunders, not misapprehension of counsel, not occasioned by his
adversary, is ground for setting aside a judgment or awarding a new trial.
Id. at 570.
55. Id. at571.
56. People v. Blevins, 96 N.E. 214, 215, 217-18 (111. 1911).
57. 143 N.E. 448 (111. 1924).
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an improper relationship with the immigrant), were set aside because the
Illinois Supreme Court found insufficient evidence.58 The insufficiency
of the evidence, however, was determined in light of the spectacularly
poor performance of counsel. "The attorney who represented defendants
in the trial court seemed to be unfamiliar with the simplest rules of
evidence and incapable of comprehending the rules when suggested to
quotations from the record will demonstrate
him by the trial court. A few 59
stupidity."
and
his ignorance
The deprivation of counsel solely through deficient performance,
then still not technically a federal constitutional violation, was implicitly
found to be one, as it was also found to be a violation of state statutes
providing for provision or appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants. The court noted:
A layman of ordinary intelligence would have conducted a much
better direct examination of this witness. Both federal and state
Constitutions provide that an accused person shall have the right to be
represented by counsel when called to answer a criminal charge, and
the Legislature has further provided that, if the accused is unable
to procure counsel, "the court shall assign him competent counsel,
his defense." These provisions are not mere
who shall conduct
60
empty formalities.
These early, often capital, cases found that a state constitution or
statute providing for counsel could be violated, by depriving a lawyer of
a continuance or time to adequately prepare, which could effectively
undermine the functioning of counsel. So, for example, a lawyer
appointed as substitute counsel in a capital murder case could not be
ordered to begin the trial the day of his appointment, lest the right to
counsel be a "barren right. 61 While there was no federal constitutional
58.
59.

Id. at 449,452,457.
Id. at 452.

60. Id. at 453.
61. See, e.g., State v. Ferris, 16 La. Ann. 424, 425 (1862). In Ferris,the court explained:
The law in securing to them the assistance of counsel did not intend to extend a barren
right; for of what avail would be the privilege of counsel to have free access to the
prisoner at all reasonable hours, if on the spur of the moment, without an opportunity of
studying the case, the former should be compelled to enter into the investigation of the
cause?
The counsel appointed by the court is entitled to a reasonable time for preparation;
and this necessitates a postponement of the trial.
Id.; see also State v. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321, 322, 325 (1880), aff'd, 74 Mo. 222 (1881) (setting
aside the capital murder conviction of an African American defendant, whose trial counsel had
"three working-days" to prepare and who did not subpoena his numerous alibi witnesses). The
Lewis court found:
When a human life is at stake, every instinct of humanity, every sentiment of justice,
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right to the appointment of counsel, let alone a federal constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel, these cases (many with affidavits
of trial counsel themselves) demonstrated that lawyers could be
sufficiently inadequate to afford-and later were sometimes themselves
willing to show-at least a few condemned defendants a new trial.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUING DUTY
While the ABA Guidelines have been cited by the U.S. Supreme
Court even before the 2003 revisions,62 remarkably few cases have cited
Guideline 10.13,63 which sets forth the continuing duty. Eight states or
demands that the particular facts of the case be more narrowly looked into, so that mere
weakness, ignorance, or helplessness may not be visited with the inflictions designed by
a general rule to punish negligence, trifling, or scheming for a delay ofjustice. Men must
not be murdered by technicalities. It is possible, in the present case, that the acts and
omissions of the defendant's attorney resulted from nothing more than a mere negligence
or inattention, such as the client should be bound to, with all its consequences, in an
attorney of his own selection. But there is at the same time in the facts detailed such a
flavor of deliberate and persistent refusal to make any preparation whatever for defense
at the trial, with such a strange desertion of the defendant,-leaving him to his fate in the
face of impending disaster,-that it is by no means difficult to imagine rather the
presence of willful and deliberate treachery. An attorney is an officer of the court,
selected and appointed as such for qualifications which imply at least a certain guaranty
that he will be honest and faithful to those who may entrust him with their causes. To
this guaranty, whatever may be its real limits or extent, the law and the courts are
necessary parties.
Lewis, 9 Mo. App. at 324.
62. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). The Court in Wiggins noted:
Counsel's conduct similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work
articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have
referred as "guides to determining what is reasonable." The ABA Guidelines provide
that investigations into mitigating evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all
reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating
evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor."
Id. (citation omitted). Prior to the ABA Guidelines, the Court had referenced the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice in Strickland v. Washington. See 466 U.S. 668, 709 & n.3 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980)). In 2005, the Court
explicitly relied upon the ABA Guidelines in Rompilla v. Beard. 545 U.S. 374, 387 & n.7 (2005).
63. One reported case has cited the Guideline 10.13 in recounting a defendant's argument.
Bane v. State, No. W2009-01653-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 2937350, at *30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar.
7, 2012). The ABA's National Capital Standards Database, which tracks implementation of the
ABA Guidelines, notes only this one citation to 10.13. See The Database, AM. B. ASS'N NAT'L
CAP. STANDARDS DATABASE, https://www.capstandards.org/about/database (last visited Feb. 16,
2014). The Guideline has also been explicitly added to the commentary to Rule 6.3(d) of the
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:
Each counsel representing a capital defendant shall make every effort to ensure that
successor counsel is provided with the complete, original file and records consistent with
the ABA Guidelinesfor the Appointment andPerformance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.13 (2003). The purpose of these rules is to ensure that files
are maintained in accordance with the ABA Guidelines and to reduce the delay that
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sub-state level jurisdictions have, at least, officially implemented some
portion of the Guidelines; 64 and some courts 65 and several defender
organizations have added Guideline 10.13 or its substance to their
performance standards.6 6
sometimes occurs in preparing the file for transfer. A file should be properly maintained
during the representation and properly stored so it can be expeditiously provided to
successor counsel.
ARIZ. R. CRIM. PROC. R. 6.3(d) cmt., in 16A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 2013). Several
commentators have discussed Guideline 10.13. See Robert S. Burke, The Illinois Death Penalty
Defense System and the ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 348, 354 (2008)
("Several Guidelines (10.13, 10.14, 10.15.1, and 10.15.2) concern the duties of counsel after
conviction, including the duty to assist successor counsel if there is one."); Lawrence J. Fox,
Making the Last Chance Meaningful: PredecessorCounsel's Ethical Duty to the CapitalDefendant,
31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1189 (2003) ("This is an institutional and inevitable conflict, and
therefore it is one that gives particular meaning, in my view, to the obligation contained in Rule
1.16 for the lawyer to take steps to protect the client's interest to the extent reasonably
practicable."); David J. Kessler, Spoliation in Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings: Theory of
Spoliation in Habeas Corpus - Part 1, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 14, 15-16; David M. Siegel, What
(Can) (Should) (Must) Defense Counsel Withhold from the Prosecution in Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Proceedings?,CHAMPION, Dec. 2011, at 18, 22, 27 n.70 [hereinafter Siegel, Withholdfrom
the Prosecution].
64. See IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2003 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL

IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

1 (2012), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/DeathPenaltyRepresentation/implem
entation fact sheet 01 2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
65. Certification for appointment as capital defense counsel in Maricopa County, Arizona
now provides, by the court-adopted legal representation plan as referenced in Guideline 2.1, that
"The Capital Defense Review Committee shall apply, in addition to the foregoing performance and
practice standards, the performance and practice standards set forth in Guidelines 10.1 through
10.13 of the ABA Guidelines." In re Adopting a Plan for Review of Appointed Defense Counsel,
No. 2012-118, slip op. at 10 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012).
66. The Georgia Public Defender Council has adopted Guideline 10.13 verbatim as Standard
13.1 of the Georgia Death Penalty Standards. GA. DEATH PENALTY STANDARDS, standard 13.1, at
17-18, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/DeathPenalty_
Representation/Standards/State/GA deathpenalty standards.authcheckdam.pdf.
District Public Defenders in Louisiana are, as of 2010, charged as part of their duties in
establishing a capital representation plan with "ensuring the continuing cooperation of trial counsel
and defense team members with appellate and post conviction counsel." See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, pt. XV, §§ 905A.1.b. (2011).
Nevada adopted Guideline 10.13 verbatim as Standard 17 of the Nevada Indigent Defense
Standards of Performance. NEV. INDIGENT DEF. STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE, standard 17, at 17,
available at http://www.washoecounty.us/repository/files/36/ADKT411 .CapPerfStds.pdf.
Amendments to the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio were adopted by the
Supreme Court of Ohio on January 12, 2010, and became effective on March 1, 2010, which
provide that only attorneys who have been qualified by the Committee on the Appointment of
Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Capital Cases may be appointed to handle capital cases, and that
"[t]he appointing court shall monitor the performance of all defense counsel to ensure that the client
is receiving representation that is consistent with the American Bar Association's 'Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases' and referred to
herein as 'high quality representation."' OHIO R. CT., SuP.R. 20.03(A) (2011).

Oregon's Office of Public Defense Services's Report to the Public Defense Services
Commission (adopted June 14, 2007) includes a "Legal Representation Plan for Death Penalty

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:447

The implementation of the continuing duty, however, through
specific steps that counsel should follow when they are subject to a postconviction action claiming IAC, has raised more pointedly the ethical
issues surrounding when, how, and to what degree former counsel could
or should disclose confidential information concerning the
representation. Most importantly, the 2010 Formal Opinion by the ABA
67
This
Committee distilled the duty into specific "do's" and "don't' s.,
mechanism, and the ABA Opinion's treatment by several state ethics
opinions, has expanded awareness of the continuing duty beyond the
capital context. This is important because recent anecdotal reports
suggest that compliance with the continuing duty, at least insofar as it
implies limiting informal contacts with the prosecution, may not be the
norm.68 Obvious pressures from the potential loss of future appointments
could challenge discharge of the continuing duty. 69 The first Subpart of
Cases," which "establishes as the standards for performance for all counsel in death penalty cases
the standards set forth in Guidelines 10.2 to 10.15.2 of the American Bar Association Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases." OR. OFFICE OF
PUB. DEF. SERVS., REPORT TO THE PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES COMMISSION 23 (2007); see also
STATE BAR OF TEX., GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR TEXAS CAPITAL COUNSEL 4-10 (2006),

supra note 9.
67. See generally ABA Opinion, supra note 10, at 1.
68. See Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation Matters: Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for
Preventing Lawyers from Surrendering to Self-Interest in Responding to Allegations of Ineffective
Assistance in Death Penalty Cases, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 486-92 (2013); Tenn. Supreme Court
Bd. of Profl Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2013-F-156 (2013) ("While ABA Formal Op. 10456 stated '... . it is highly unusual' for a trial lawyer accused of providing ineffective representation
to assist the prosecution in advance of testifying in a judicial proceeding, anecdotally, it does not
appear unusual in Tennessee." (quoting ABA Opinion, supra note 10, at 1)); see also D.C. Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364 (2013). D.C. Bar Opinion 364 states:
Anecdotal evidence suggests that different defense lawyers react differently to
prosecutors' requests for information. At one end of the spectrum are lawyers who are
angered by the claim and eager to beat it back. Attorneys have a reputational interest in
having IAC claims defeated. They may also fear future civil claims by the former client.
At the other end of the spectrum are attorneys who police themselves for potential
IAC issues. When such lawyers or their supervisors spot such an issue, they withdraw,
refer the client to other counsel, and cooperate with the new counsel. If new counsel tells
them that the client objects to any voluntary disclosure to prosecutors, they do not
disclose until a court requires them to do so.
Between those extremes are understandably concerned lawyers who do not want to
jeopardize their licenses, their reputations, or their ability to continue doing defense
work but who may not want to assist the prosecution against a former client. Courtappointed lawyers under the Criminal Justice Act may be especially uncomfortable
because their livelihoods depend on continued appointments by the court that will be
considering the IAC claim.
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
69. Beyond anecdotal reports, new legislation in Florida to expedite executions embodies
such an incentive structure by disqualifying counsel for five years from appointment in capital
representation if they have been twice found to have provided ineffective assistance and relief was
granted as a result. Section Capital Punishment-Timely Justice Act, 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., ch.
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this Part addresses the ABA Opinion, the second addresses opinions by
state ethics authorities in response to the ABA Opinion, and the final
Subpart addresses developing case law.7 °
A. American Bar Association Ethics Opinion
In 2012, the ABA Committee formally addressed the conflict
between the continuing duty and the waiver of privilege that is
universally held to accompany an allegation of ineffective assistance.71
The ABA Opinion noted that the attorney-client privilege and the
obligation of confidentiality both continue beyond the representation,
and, while an IAC claim impliedly waives the privilege with respect to
allegations concerning lawyer-client communications, it does not end the
obligation to maintain confidentiality. 72 While the Committee
recognized there could be a limited need for a lawyer to reveal
information concerning a former client to defend herself when the
former client has alleged ineffective assistance, it set a high bar for such
revelations; it requires that the lawyer reasonably believe the disclosures
are necessary, that the lawyer take steps to minimize the disclosures, and
that the disclosures be made in a court-supervised proceeding.73
Both the requirements that disclosures be reasonably necessary and
that they be minimized were inherent in Model Rule of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rule") 1.6(b)(5). 74 The requirement of "courtsupervised proceedings," however, was an interpreted application of the
Model Rule, implied by the concern that without court supervision,
disclosures that were otherwise unnecessary, or more than necessary,
might be made.75 This requirement is entirely appropriate to discharge
the continuing duty, given the lawyer's inherent conflict as both the
subject of the IAC allegation and the source of information concerning
it. 76 While many opinions begin and end their treatment with the
observation that the filing of an IAC claim waives the attorneyclient privilege, which to a limited degree it does, as I have argued
2013-216, § 27.7045 (West). This statute sets a financial incentive directly countering counsel's
continuing duty, imposes an additional hurdle for successor counsel to obtain the cooperation of
prior counsel, and links what may be an unrelated consideration (whether relief was granted) to
analysis of counsel's performance.
70. See infra Part H.A-C.
71. See generally ABA Opinion, supranote 10.
72. Id. at 1-2.
73. Id. at 5.
74.

Id. at 3-4; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2013).

75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5); ABA Opinion, supra note 10, at 5.
76. Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoC. 347, 368-69 (2009).
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elsewhere, the ethical obligations are especially significant outside
judicial supervision:
However, the evidentiary privilege only matters in a formal proceeding
(in which testimony is given); outside formal proceedings disclosures
are limited only by ethical rules, so the circumstance under which
access to defense counsel occurs is quite significant. Three key issues
have emerged: (1) Must disclosures of non-privileged information
occur in supervised or non-supervised settings? (2) Are releases of
information subject to pre-disclosure judicial review? (3) What control
is made over subsequent use
77 of the disclosures, e.g., by protective
orders, in later proceedings?
While the ABA Opinion did not resolve these issues, it did make their
treatment much more explicit, and, at least judging from the state ethics
opinions discussed in the next Subpart, more intentional.
B. State Ethics Opinions
To date, four ethics bodies (District of Columbia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia) have weighed in on the issue addressed in the
ABA Opinion.78 While all four have acknowledged the basis for the
ABA Opinion's concern about unnecessary disclosures, three of the four
have nevertheless concluded, without specifically explaining why, that
judicial supervision was not required.79 Virginia's ethics body, which
addressed the matter a month before issuance of the ABA Opinion,
foreshadowed its analysis, and specifically rejected efficiency and
procedural speed as reasons for permitting out of court disclosures.80 The
Virginia authority recommended that, without facts and circumstances
justifying an earlier release of information, former counsel should
77. Siegel, Withholdfrom the Prosecution,supranote 63, at 20-21.
78. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364 (2013); N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 16
(2011); Tenn. Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2013-F-156 (2013);
Va. State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1859 (2012).
79. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364; N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 16; Tenn.
Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2013-F-156.
80. Va. State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1859. The Virginia ethics committee commented:
Although a pre-litigation disclosure of all relevant information may make it more
likely that the claim of ineffective assistance will be disposed of quickly, that fact alone
does not make it necessary that the lawyer reveal the information. In the absence of
additional facts and circumstances justifying an earlier release of the information, the
lawyer can reach the same outcome by disclosing the information under judicial
supervision in a formal proceeding, after a full determination of what information should
be revealed, and without the danger of revealing more information than would be
permitted by Rule 1.6(b)(2).
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disclose information only under judicial supervision in a formal
proceeding after full determination of what information should be
revealed.81 It noted that, while an IAC claim "concerns" lawyer's
representation, it is usually not reasonably necessary to disclose
anything in response to a mere filing given the number of petitions that
fail on legal and procedural grounds. 82 This is fully consistent with the
ABA Opinion.
The North Carolina State Bar, however, explicitly rejected the ABA
Opinion, explaining that Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) did not require that a
lawyer's exercise of discretion, to determine what disclosures were
83
reasonably necessary, be done only in a court-supervised proceeding.
Moreover, the state's post-conviction statute specifically provided that
the filing of an allegation of IAC was deemed a waiver of the privilege
for both written and oral communications "to the extent the defendant's
prior counsel reasonably believes such communications are necessary to
defend against the allegations of ineffectiveness. 84 Despite its rejection
of the need for judicial supervision of disclosures, the North Carolina
opinion cautioned that the Rule (and the post-conviction statute)
required former counsel to "respond in a manner that is narrowly
tailored to address the specific facts underlying the specific claim"; that
counsel "still has a duty to avoid the disclosure of information that is not
responsive to the specific claim"; and that the prosecutor "must limit his
request to information relevant to the defendant's specific allegations of
ineffective assistance. 85
The District of Columbia Bar Ethics Committee ("D.C.
Committee") also rejected the ABA Opinion's restriction on disclosures
outside court supervision, but it did so based on a distinction between
the D.C. Rules and the Model Rules.86 D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3) provides:
A lawyer may use or reveal client confidences or secrets ... to the
extent reasonably necessary to establish a defense to a criminal charge,
disciplinary charge, or civil claim, formally instituted against the
lawyer, based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to the
extent reasonably necessary to respond to specific allegations by the
client concerning the lawyer's representation of the client ... 87

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 16.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(e) (2011)).
Id.
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364 (2013).
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(e) (2007).
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The D.C. Committee noted the distinction in D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3)
between disclosure to establish a defense to formal charges and "to
respond to specific allegations," which the drafters of the rule suggested
would extend to public allegations made
by the client even if there were
88
no formal charges against the lawyer.
The D.C. Committee relied heavily on the distinctions between the
wording of Model Rule 1.6 and D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3):
The permissive disclosure exception in D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3) differs
from its Model Rule counterpart in three respects. D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3)
applies only to "specific" allegations, and only when made "by the
client." By contrast, Model Rule 1.6(b)(5) does not condition
disclosure on the allegations being "specific," and does not require that
the "allegations" come from the lawyer's client. Finally, D.C. Rule
1.6(e)(3), unlike Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), does not' 89 require that the
disclosure be made in the context of a "proceeding."
The problem with this argument, as applied to IAC claims, is that it
ignores the fact that there is a proceeding (if the former client has
alleged IAC); and the relevant issue is not whether there must be a
proceeding for the disclosure, but whether disclosures permissible under
the D.C. Rule 1.6(e)(3) should be made in the proceeding or can be
made anywhere. Unless the D.C. Committee thinks that such disclosures
pose no risks of compromising any obligations to former clients, it is
hard to imagine the disclosures could be equally properly made in a
court-supervised proceeding (where the former client may object) or
through an editorial of a newspaper. The failure to recognize this
difference is particularly odd when the D.C. Committee had nevertheless
acknowledged the potential for a lawyer's own motivation to affect his
or her judgment about disclosures: "Further complicating a lawyer's
analysis is the emotional reaction that the lawyer may have upon
learning that a former client has accused her of IAC. Feelings of anger
and betrayal may impede an objective analysis of these issues." 90 These
are just the types of concerns that make judicial supervision appropriate.
Most recently, the Board of Professional Responsibility of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee ("Tennessee Board") opined that
Tennessee's Rules of Professional Conduct ("Tennessee Rules")
"permit, but do not require [a lawyer] to make limited voluntary
disclosure[s] to the prosecution of information" "outside the in-court

88. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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supervised proceeding." 91 Rule 1.6(b)(5) of the Tennessee Rules
governing permissive disclosure is identical to ABA Model Rule
1.6(b)(5).9 2 The Tennessee Rule governing mandatory disclosure, like
the Model Rule, requires disclosure in response to the order of a tribunal.
However, it is slightly more protective against disclosure than the Model
Rule because it includes the obligations of counsel to "asser[t] on behalf
of the client all non-frivolous claims that the information sought by the
tribunal is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or
other applicable law," whereas the Model Rule only explains these
obligations in a Comment. 93
Thus, while Tennessee imposes duties on counsel to oppose courtordered disclosures concerning former clients under in-court
supervision, which are more explicit than those under the Model
Rules, it is particularly curious that its ethics body nevertheless
decided that unsupervised, out-of-court disclosures for some reason
require less restriction.
The Tennessee Board recognizes, as did the ABA Committee, that
the self-defense exception might be read to extend to situations in which
a lawyer has been alleged to have rendered ineffective assistance, but
simply notes that "[t]he exception does not require that the disclosures
be made in an in-court supervised proceeding or setting nor with the
supervision or approval of the court., 94 While this is true, since the
Model Rule does not mention court supervision of disclosures either, it
is difficult to see why this matters. Indeed, the language of court
supervision originally comes from Comment 14 to Model Rule 1.6, 95
which, as noted above, Tennessee has imported into the text of
Tennessee Rule 1.6(b)(5).9 6

The Tennessee Board notes in passing the apparent concern about
inappropriate motivations for out-of-court disclosures: "Neither
91. Tenn. Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2013-F-156 (2013)
("May a criminal defense lawyer alleged by a former criminal client to have rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel voluntarily provide information to the prosecutor defending the claim outside
the court supervised setting?").
92.

TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2013).

93. Compareid R. 1.6(c)(2), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 13 (2013).
94. Tenn. Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2013-F-156.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14. Comment 14 to Model Rule 1.6
states:
If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure
should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other
persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements
should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
Id.
96. See supranotes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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anger nor retaliation toward the former client for having alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel justify the former lawyer to disclose
such information outside the in-court proceeding., 97 Curiously, it
never suggests what would be appropriate justifications for making
any appropriate
unsupervised,
out-of-court disclosures-since
"self-defense" by the former counsel can be accomplished through incourt disclosures.98
C. Developing Case Law Since the ABA Opinion
While some state ethics bodies have questioned the ABA Opinion's
workability (acknowledging the force of its basic assertion), most cases
addressing the issue since the ABA Opinion have largely followed its
recommendations. Virtually all the reported cases to date are federal,
although many are non-capital. Workability has been raised in some
cases by the government, though at least once workability has been
raised as a reason that the IAC claims can be addressed without seeking
disclosures from former counsel. 99 This Subpart offers a snapshot of how
the limits on informal and unsupervised disclosures to the prosecution
are being interpreted.' 0 0
1. To What Extent Are Lawyers Refusing to Make Disclosures
Outside Court-Supervised Proceedings?
This is a difficult question to examine systematically because of the
range of circumstances in which allegations of IAC might arise (state
post-conviction, federal habeas, motions to vacate or set aside, motions
for new trial), and counsel's resistance to disclosures may not reach the
level of a formal pleading. For example, if a lawyer simply informs the
government that she will not cooperate or make disclosures outside of a
court-supervised proceeding, the government may simply seek an
evidentiary hearing. There have been reported instances, reflected in

97. Tenn. Supreme Court Bd. of Prof l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 2013-F-156.
98. Id.
99. Government's Opposition to Petition to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a
Person in Federal Custody at 10 n.1, United States v. Trigilio, No. 2:08-CR-00292, 2010 WL
1329069 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (No. 2:08-CR-00292) (responding to defendant's motion to
vacate on grounds of [AC in sentencing by stating that claims can be resolved without disclosures
because "procedures required to define the contours of the appropriate waiver and implement it with
the required limitations could significantly delay proceedings in this case," though acknowledging,
if the court finds that disclosures are required, that it "find a limited waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and permit the government to submit a filing setting forth procedures for implementing the
waiver").
100. See infra Part III.C.1-2.
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pleadings and orders, of individual lawyers refusing to make disclosures
concerning former clients outside of supervised proceedings. 1
In all of these cases, obviously, the prosecution sought disclosures
from former counsel. If these disclosures were sought outside supervised
proceedings, under the ABA Opinion, they could be considered
misconduct, as attempts to induce another (the former counsel) to violate
the Model Rules.10 2 There is already an ethical restriction on subpoenas
of defense lawyers by prosecutors unless the information is not protected
by privilege: that is, "essential to the successful completion of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution," and there is "no other feasible
alternative to obtain the information.' ', 0 3 Given the importance of
ensuring an accurate record of any prospective disclosures, and the
ethical restriction on compelled (that is, subpoenaed) disclosures, it
would seem prudent that there be at least as great a restriction on efforts
to obtain voluntary disclosures from former counsel as there are on
efforts to obtain compelled disclosures. Since the court handling the IAC
petition must determine the scope of the privilege waiver, even if it is
"essential" to the prosecution's defense against the IAC claim, there is
always a feasible alternative to unsupervised disclosures-namely,
subpoenaing the former counsel.
A general policy by prosecutors not to seek unsupervised
04
disclosures would be useful in this regard for at least two reasons.1
First, it would enable lawyers trying to comply with their ethical
obligations to have a clearer path to do so. There are instances of former
lawyers seeking to intervene when their former clients filed pro se postconviction claims of IAC, in an effort to obtain court supervision of

101. See, e.g., United States v. Rankin, No. 5:10CV80253, 2010 WL 5478472, at *1 (W.D. Va.
Dec. 30, 2010) (explaining that an evidentiary hearing is required where a former attorney declined
to provide an affidavit refuting defendant's claim that he had asked the attorney to file a direct
appeal); see also, e.g., Response of the United States to Attorney's Motion to Quash at 2, United
States v. Mitchell, No. 3:11-CR-286-2, 2012 WL 2049944 (E.D. Va. June 6, 2012) (No.
3:10CR286) ("In several discussions, [former counsel] has refused to provide the United States with
information regarding the allegations of ineffective assistance and indicated he would likely not
meet with the government before the hearing ....
");
United States' Motion to Compel Testimony of
Defendant's Former Attorney at 1,United States v. Tronco-Ramirez, No. 5:10-cr-00028, 2011 WL
3841528 (W.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2011) (No. 10CR00028) (seeking court order because former counsel
informed the government he would not disclose prior communications with the former client who
sought to withdraw his guilty plea without court order).
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2013).
103. Id. R. 3.8(e)(l)-(3).
104. A former version of Model Rule 3.8 would have required judicial pre-approval of such a
subpoena as well, although this was removed in 1990. See Stem v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of
Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT
101, at 1 (1995)).
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disclosures.10 5 Second, it would avoid unfairly disadvantaging
petitioners whose former counsel did not adhere to this ethical standard.
There have been instances of lawyers rejecting the existence of the
continuing duty, 106 including
doing so by refusing to provide former
07
clients' information.
It has been reported that some lawyers have also begun citing the
ABA Opinion as a basis for refusing to simply provide the government a
refutation of their former client's claims when responding to an
allegation of ineffective assistance. 10 8 Discipline has been recommended
for at least one lawyer who was found to have pre-emptively disclosed,
outside of a court-supervised proceeding, confidential information in
response to an IAC allegation. °9 While the matter ison appeal, the
disciplinary authority has cited the ABA Opinion to specifically reject
the argument that former counsel could justify his conduct as preventing
his former client's perjury, noting that he "no longer had a duty to act to
prevent any alleged client perjury. That duty transferred to successor
counsel. Instead, [former counsel] owed a continuing duty of
105. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, No. CV10-01683, 2011 WL 338800, at *1-3 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2011) (ruling that former counsel could not intervene, for the purpose of having the
court conduct an in camera hearing with pro se petitioner and former counsel, and that it would not
appoint counsel for pro se petitioner). The Mitchell court found privilege waiver and authorized
former counsel "to provide evidence of his otherwise privileged conversations with petitioner by
way of affidavit, testimony, or in any other form," but did specifically limit the use of disclosures
only to IAC claims in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition or otherwise keep them confidential. Id.
106. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Dingus, No. 5:12-0043, 2013 WL 1694878, at *3-5 (S.D. W. Va.
Apr. 18, 2013) (recounting that former counsel explicitly rejected the idea of continuing duty of
loyalty, barring subsequent use of material disclosed in future proceedings, and barring further
communications between former counsel and state attorney general's office in the § 2255
proceeding, explaining that "[u]nsupervised communications between the Petitioner's or Movant's
trial and appellate attorney and the attorney for the State or the United States in Section 2254 and
Section 2255 proceedings are prohibited").
107. See, e.g., United States v. Sharp, Crim. No. 2:07CR19, 2009 WL 1867619, at *1 (N.D. W.
Va. June 29, 2009) (discussing that petitioner, who claimed that former counsel entered secret
agreement with prosecution to prevent his testifying, was refused an affidavit by former trial
counsel).
108. United States v. Rankin, No. 5:10CV80253, 2010 WL 5478472, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Va. Dec.
30, 2010) ("According to the government's motion to dismiss, the defendant's attorney declined to
provide an affidavit refuting the defendant's claim that he asked the attorney to file a direct appeal,
based on [the ABA Opinion].").
109. Brief of Complainant-Respondent at 14-17, In re Thompson, (No. 11AP2458-D), 2012
WL 6569753. The Brief of Complainant-Respondent in In re Thompson stated:
This ABA Ethics Opinion makes it clear that Thompson went far beyond any reasonable
or necessary standards. He did not have to send the letter to the Court. He could have
waited and testified at the Machner hearing and then been afforded all the necessary
protections of a Court order. Instead, without the client's knowledge or approval, he
bulled ahead and, without justification, totally undermined the appellate defense being
mounted on behalf of his former client.
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confidentiality and loyalty to his former client and should not have taken
an adverse or antagonistic position against that client."' 110
2. Is the Continuing Duty Being Interpreted to Prevent
Disclosures of Former Counsel Outside Court Supervision?
A few court decisions have rejected the ABA Opinion as
unworkable,' or have developed a boilerplate order that effectively
undermines it by providing that petitioners alleging IAC must waive all
claims of privilege without limit, and authorize counsel to disclose
confidential information without any opportunity for the client to contest
the former counsel's need to make disclosures.' 12 This interpretation of
court-supervised testimony, namely a court ordering that it be provided
without subsequently supervising it, seems to place all decision-making
for the necessity of disclosures on the former counsel who, as the ABA
Opinion noted, obviously has a conflict. Court "supervision" should
mean more than simply a court ordering former counsel to 1submit
an
3
prosecution'
the
to
disclosed
immediately
be
will
that
affidavit
While the law, in all jurisdictions to consider the matter, holds that
the filing of a post-conviction allegation of IAC is a waiver of the
privilege, virtually all also hold that it is a limited waiver. Thus, despite
the efforts of some prosecutors, several courts have refused to order
privilege waivers by IAC petitioners, and have instead focused on
authorizing former counsel to make limited disclosures that are
reasonably necessary to address the allegations. 1 4 Several decisions
110, Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
111. See, e.g., Dunlap v. United States, No. 4:11-cv-70082-RBH, 2011 WL 269315, at *1 &
n.4 (D.S.C. July 12, 2011) (noting that ABA Opinion 10-456 is unpersuasive); Giordano v. United
States, No. 3:llcv9, 2011 WL 1831578, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2011) (rejecting ABA Formal
Opinion 10-456's position that the court must directly supervise discussions between government
counsel and the attorney accused of ineffectiveness); Government's Motion for an Order Finding
Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege & Motion to Compel Production of Records at 7, United States
v. Ugochukwu, No. 1:10CR405, 2012 WL 6730064 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2012) (No. 653), 2011 WL
7809857 (citing Giordano,2011 WL 1831578, at *3). The Giordano court held that "[a]s far as this
Court is aware, no federal court has ever required that Government counsel's interview with a
prisoner's former counsel in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim be on-therecord," and further noted that "[i]t would be highly impractical to require federal district court
judges... to directly supervise every interaction between the Government and the attorney who
allegedly provided ineffective assistance." Giordano, 2011 WL 1831578, at *3.
112. Douglas v. United States, No. 09 CV 9566, 2011 WL 335861, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28,
2011) ("The form authorizes your attorney to disclose confidential communications (1) only in
response to a court order and (2) only to the extent necessary to shed light on the allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel that are raised by your motion.").
113. Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 4386532, at *3-5, *8 (W.D.
Mo. Oct. 28, 2010) (relying solely on affidavits, the court found all disclosures in a 117-page prehearing affidavit filed by former counsel necessary to rebut IAC allegations).
114. See Belcher v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-04717, 2012 WL 5386564, at *3-4 (S.D. W.
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have specifically barred unsupervised communications between the
government and former counsel. 115 A few decisions have created
sequential disclosure procedures in which former counsel's proposed
disclosures are made before the hearing to successor counsel and the
court for review; the court may then consider and rule on any
objections before the disclosures are made to the prosecution.116 Finally,
a few courts have imposed restrictions on subsequent use of
disclosures, the most
detailed and extensive of which seem to have been
7
in capital cases."l
Va. Nov. 1, 2012) (refusing to order a privilege waiver by a § 2255 petitioner, but ordering former
counsel to respond to allegations by affidavit with documents he believed necessary, authorizing
disclosures that counsel found reasonably necessary, and issuing a protective order barring any
future use by the government); Talouzi v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-01687, 2012 WL 3778848, at
*3 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 30, 2012) (ordering counsel to provide an affidavit including "all of the
information [counsel] believes is necessary to fully respond to the claim and [to] include as
attachments copies of any documents from his file specifically addressing the subject of Movant's
appeal," noting, however, that documents may be redacted if they address other aspects of counsel's
representation of movant, and that "counsel should disclose only that information reasonably
necessary to ensure the fairness of these proceedings"); see also Young v. United States, No. 2:13cv-10108, 2013 WL 2468623, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. June 7, 2013) (ordering former counsel to file an
affidavit specifically restricted to the claim of IAC, and specifically authorizing disclosure of only
communications "necessary to fully respond to the claim"-documents relating to plea offer and
petitioner's decision to go to trial-ordering that former counsel may redact other matters from the
documents, and specifying that counsel should "disclose only that information reasonably necessary
to ensure the fairness of these proceedings"); Hall v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-01039, 2012 WL
3822163, at *3-4 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 4, 2012) (issuing same order as in Talouzi, plus a protective
order specifying that attorney-client privilege "shall not be deemed automatically waived in any
other Federal or State proceeding by virtue of the above-ordered disclosure in this § 2255
proceeding" and prohibiting the government from using privileged disclosures in any other
proceeding without a court order).
115. Daugherty v. Dingus, No. 5:12-0043, 2013 WL 1694878, at *4-5 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 18,
2013); Hudson v. United States, No. 3:10-cv-00981, 2011 WL 3667602, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Aug.
22, 2011) (ordering movant's counsel to file an affidavit, but denying government's request to speak
with counsel outside presence of movant and the court).
116. Jones v. United States, No. 4:11CV00702, 2012 WL 484663, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 14,
2012) (ordering hearing before government's cross examination of trial counsel, the court's
determination of scope, and in camera file review if needed); Nelson v. United States, No. 4:04-CV8005-FJG, 2010 WL 3398791, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 2010) (ordering prior counsel's prehearing affidavit reviewed by court and successor counsel for objection and ruling before its release
to the government).
117. See, e.g., Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 813, 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2012). This was the
protective order:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all discovery granted to Respondents, including
the requests to depose sentencing counsel Brogna, Petitioner's experts and Petitioner,
shall be deemed to be confidential. Any information, documents and materials obtained
vis-a-vis the discovery process may be used only by representatives from the Office of
the Arizona Attorney General and only for purposes of any proceedings incident to
litigating the claims presented in the petition for writ of habeas corpus (and all
amendments thereto) pending before this Court. None may be disclosed to any other
persons or agencies, including any other law enforcement or prosecutorial personnel or
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That successor counsel may seek to restrict disclosures by former
counsel is hardly surprising, as successor counsel is ethically obligated
to pursue all potentially meritorious claims.' 18 Unless these are
professionally inappropriate strategies, former counsel is ethically
obligated to cooperate with these strategies." 9 In fact, all the ethical
obligations in this scenario are aligned. Former counsel has a continuing
duty to petitioner to avoid disclosures that are not reasonably necessary
(as well as a duty to continue to maintain and defend as privileged
anything not subject to the limited waiver inherent in the filing of an
IAC claim).120 Present counsel has an ethical obligation to competently
and diligently represent the petitioner (which includes, in advancing the
lAC claim, ensuring that information disclosed is not used in any
subsequent prosecution). And, while the prosecutor certainly has an
obligation to competently and diligently defend against the petition, this
cannot include efforts to obtain disclosures through means that require a
lawyer to violate her ethical duties. Against these obligations are
obvious personal reactions and incentives: no one likes being accused of
having done a poor job; people are often more forthcoming in informal,
private settings (like a phone call), than they are in formal, public ones
(such as testifying in court); and individuals are demonstrably poor
judges of their own compliance with rules (such as the continuing duty
to avoid disclosures that are not reasonably necessary) when they could
benefit (for example, by disputing an accusation about their work,
or undermining the effectiveness of such a claim by showing that it
would not have affected the outcome) from not complying with the
Model Rules.

agencies, without an order from this Court. This Order shall continue in effect after the
conclusion of the habeas corpus proceedings and specifically shall apply in the event of a

resentencing, except that either party maintains the right to request modification or
vacation of this Order upon entry of final judgment in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents' deposition of Petitioner must
specifically relate to assertions Petitioner has made in this habeas petition (or
amendments thereto), and for which it is likely that Petitioner has personal knowledge.
The questions must be phrased in such a manner that they are directly linked to the
federal claim upon which Petitioner is being deposed. Petitioner may assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege, but the assertion of that privilege may be cause for the Court to
draw an adverse inference in this habeas proceeding.
Id. at 813.
118. ABAGUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 10.8, at 1028-29.
119. Id. Guideline 10.13(D), at 1074; see Eldred, supranote 68, at 478-86.
120. See Eldred, supra note 68, at 478-86.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The continuing duty of counsel to former clients has been
recognized by some lawyers, as evidenced by their conduct, well over a
century before the ABA Guidelines identified it. 12 1 While discharge of
the duty can be difficult, professionally and personally, as the ABA
122
Opinion acknowledged, that is hardly a reason for disregarding it.
Compliance with this duty is neither technically difficult nor legally
complex. If prosecutors do not seek informal disclosures from former
counsel, former counsel are aware that it is unethical to make such
disclosures, and present counsel know there are established mechanisms
to avoid them and ensure they do not occur, disclosures should not
occur. Most lawyers quickly develop an inherent and almost
instantaneous reluctance to discuss anything concerning the details of a
client's case with anyone outside carefully delineated contexts. A
dissatisfied former client is simply not one of these contexts.

121. See supra Partl.
122. See supra Part II.A.
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